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Research on the consequences of perceiving disorder is largely sociological and concerns
broken windows theory, which states that signs of social disorder cause further social
disorder. The predominant psychological explanations for this phenomenon are primarily
social. In contrast, I propose a parsimonious cognitive model (“world-is-random” model;
WIR) that may partly account for these effects. Basically, WIR proposes that perceiving
disorder primes randomness-related concepts, which results in a reduction to one’s sense
of personal control, which has diverse affective, judgmental, and behavioral consequences.
I review recent developments on the psychological consequences of perceiving disorder
and argue that WIR can explain all of these ﬁndings. I also cover select correlational ﬁndings
from the sociological literature and explain how WIR can at least partly explain them. In
a general discussion, I consider possible alternative psychological models and argue that
they do not adequately explain the most recent psychological research on disorder. I then
propose future directions which include determining whether perceiving disorder causes
a “unique psychology” and delimiting boundary conditions.
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Most of the research on the possible effects of perceived dis-
order on humans is sociological and concerns broken windows
theory (BWT). BWT basically states that signs of social disorder
(e.g., broken windows) cause further social disorder (e.g., more
vandalism, theft; Wilson and Kelling, 1982; see also Keizer et al.,
2008). Explanations for broken windows effects (BWE) are gen-
erally social. They focus on social norms, social signaling, and
lack of social monitoring. In contrast, in this article, I propose
a cognitive, “inside-one-head” model of the psychological conse-
quences of perceiving disorder. After proceedingwith the cognitive
analysis, I turn back to the important naturally occurring social
phenomena that I believe are partly explained by this cognitive
model.
Before reviewing some recent developments relevant to this
model, I should operationalize what I mean by “perceived disor-
der” (and “perceived order”): Perceived disorder is an interpreted
state of the world in which things are in non-patterned and non-
coherent positions. Oppositely, perceived order is an interpreted
state of the world in which things are in patterned and coherent
positions. Note that these broad deﬁnitions include all animate or
inanimate things (i.e., all things that can be represented in mental
“chunks”), and thus may apply both to purely physical disorder
(e.g., objects randomly scattered about on a computer screen)
and social disorder (e.g., littering, crime). The key requirement is
that the stimuli are processed as non-patterned and non-coherent
chunks.
There seems to be a developing interest among psychologists in
the consequences of perceived disorder on humanpsychology (not
necessarily in the context of BWT, however). Recently, some con-
sequences of perceived disorder pertinent to the proposed model
were documented by – in chronological order – Heintzelman et al.
(2013), Vohs et al. (2013), and Chae and Zhu (2014): Heintzel-
man et al. (2013) documented a psychological state consequence
of disorder. Across four studies, they manipulated perceived dis-
order either by (a) presenting people with pictures of seasons
in temporal sequence (e.g., autumn, winter, spring, summer)
or random sequence (e.g., winter, autumn, summer, spring;
Experiments 1 and 2) or, in a more stripped-down presentation,
(b) presenting people with semantic triads (i.e., Remote Asso-
ciates Test items; Mednick, 1962) that were either coherent (e.g.,
“falling, actor, dust”; common associate: star) or incoherent (e.g.,
“belt, deal, nose”; Experiments 3 and 4). Subsequently, people
across all four experiments reported less meaning in life in the
disorderly condition than in the orderly condition (ds ranging
from 0.37 to 0.54). Vohs et al. (2013) documented some judg-
ment and behavioral consequences of perceived disorder. Across
three experiments, they manipulated the immediate lab envi-
ronment to be either orderly or disorderly. People in disorderly
environments donated less (d = 0.73) and chose fewer healthier
snacks (ϕ = 0.37; Experiment 1); they were rated as more cre-
ative in coming up with alternative uses for an ordinary object
(d = 0.61; Experiment 2); and they showed stronger preference
for an unconventional product whereas those in the orderly envi-
ronment showed stronger preference for a conventional product
(interaction, ϕ = 0.20; Experiment 3). Most recently, Chae and
Zhu (2014) documented some other judgment, behavioral, and
state consequences of perceived disorder. Across four experiments,
they manipulated perceived disorder à la Vohs et al. (2013) – by
having people do tasks in either a disorderly or orderly lab environ-
ment. Compared with people in the orderly environment, people
in disorderly environments reported being willing to pay more
for tempting but unnecessary products (d = 0.43; Experiment
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 606 | 1
Kotabe A cognitive perspective on perceived disorder
1); they reacted slower in a Stroop task (d = 0.46) and reported
feeling more depleted (d = 0.69; Experiment 2); and they did
not persist as long on an unsolvable puzzle (d = 0.42, Experi-
ment 3; d = 0.73, Experiment 4). Further, and most germane to
the proposed model, they found in Experiment 4 that a threat to
feeling in control mediated the effects of perceived disorder on
persistence.
Perceived disorder apparently has a variety of psychological
consequences for affect (broadly deﬁned, see Gross and Thomp-
son, 2007), judgment, and behavior. Is there a common process
underlying these effects? Next, I will elaborate on a model that
could account for the foregoing experimental ﬁndings as well as
correlational ﬁndings in the sociological literature. In a general
discussion, I will discuss three possible alternative psychological
models that may explain some but not all of these ﬁndings, as well
as future directions.
THE WORLD IS RANDOM
To follow along, see Figure 1 for a diagram of the pro-
posed world-is-random model (WIR): Neglecting randomness,
chance, and luck leads us to an illusion of control. WIR pro-
poses that perceiving disorder primes concepts related with ran-
domness/chance/luck (thus creating a “world-is-random” mind-
set). It may thus lead us to (accurately) believe we have less
control over outcomes in low-control/high-chance situations
because we weight available representations related to random-
ness/chance/luck more (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Through
the same mechanism, it may even lead us to (erroneously) believe
we have less control over ourselves when strongly tempted (i.e.,
when in a state of low-control/high-chance). This sense of losing
personal control may have a variety of affective, judgmental, and
behavioral consequences.
WIR can account for the experimental ﬁndings discussed
earlier. Regarding the investigation on perceived disorder and
meaning in life by Heintzelman et al. (2013), WIR explains
these results as a negative consequence of losing a sense of per-
sonal control. Feeling in control is a fundamental human need
(White, 1959; Bandura, 1977; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Higgins,
2011). If not met, humans suffer. One plausible manifestation,
according to self-determination theory, is a feeling that life is
meaningless because one cannot control outcomes (unfulﬁlled
competence need) or choose their own way (unfulﬁlled autonomy
need).
The sense of losing control resulting from perceiving disor-
der can also explain the results from the experiments by Vohs
et al. (2013). In Experiment 1, people in a disorderly environ-
ment (a) donated less and (b) chose fewer healthy snacks. Having
personal control means being able to agentically inﬂuence out-
comes (White, 1959; Deci and Ryan, 1985). Thus, people whose
sense of personal control is reduced, by deﬁnition, see their
actions (e.g., donating) as having less consequence. Similarly,
people whose sense of personal control is reduced are likely to
see their efforts to control oneself as more in vain, thus it fol-
lows that they would exert less self-control. In Experiment 2,
people in a disorderly environment were rated as more creative.
Research has shown that people are more creative when they
enter a state of “ﬂow,” which necessitates, among other operating
conditions, a reduction in executive control (Csikszentmihalyi,
1997). WIR proposes that, through priming and increasing the
judgment weight of randomness-related concepts, perceived dis-
order decreases our sense of control over oneself. Such changes to
our beliefs may reduce the motivation to exert executive control
(Job et al., 2010; Kotabe and Hofmann, submitted), facilitating
advancement into a ﬂow state of unshackled creativity. Regard-
ing Experiment 3, people in a disorderly environment more
strongly preferred an unconventional product whereas people in
an orderly environment more strongly preferred a conventional
product. WIR explains these results similar to how it explains
the results from Experiment 2. By reducing our sense of per-
sonal control and use of control resources, perceived disorder
may facilitate a state of ﬂow in which conventional boundaries
“disappear.”
World-is-random explains the results from the experiments by
Chae and Zhu (2014) in a slightly different way. It assumes that
the sense of losing control is threatening, and that this threat,
in turn, is depleting to cognitive resources (Glass et al., 1969;
Baumeister et al., 2007; Inzlicht and Kang, 2010), thus resulting
in more impulsive behaviors across various domains. Accordingly,
in Experiment 1, people in a disorderly environment were willing
to pay more for tempting products and, in Experiment 2, peo-
ple in a disorderly environment were slower to react in a Stroop
task and reported feeling more depleted. In Experiments 3 and 4,
people in a disorderly environment persisted less on an unsolv-
able puzzle. Moreover, the authors showed that a reduction in
and threat to one’s sense of personal control mediated the effect
of perceived disorder on persistence in Experiment 4, consistent
with the mechanisms I propose.
WIR can also (partly) explain a variety of correlational ﬁnd-
ings in the sociological literature. For brevity, and because this
paper does not focus on the sociological consequences of perceived
disorder, I will only review select research intended to demon-
strate the breadth of ﬁndings WIR may at least partly account
for (for a summary, see Table 1)1. First, take a cross-sectional
1Across the selected studies, they control for various community- and individual-
level variables such as urban area, neighborhood disadvantage, race, education,
and income that may correlate with the dependent variables, yet perceived disorder
remained a signiﬁcant covariate.
FIGURE 1 |The world-is-random (WIR) model.
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Table 1 | Select experimental and correlational findings on the psychological consequences of disorder.
Method Reference Finding
Experimental Cialdini et al. (1990), Cialdini (2007) Perceived disorder in one domain increases the creation of
disorder in the same domain
Keizer et al. (2008) Perceived disorder in one domain (e.g., grafﬁti) spreads to
creation of disorder in another domain (e.g., littering)
Keizer et al. (2008) Perceived disorder weakens “act appropriately” goal and
consequently strengthens hedonic (e.g., litter) and gain (e.g.,
steal) goals
Heintzelman et al. (2013) Perceived disorder decreases self-reported meaning in life
Vohs et al. (2013) Perceived disorder decreases healthy choices and generosity
Vohs et al. (2013) Perceived disorder decreases conventionality and increases
creativity
Chae and Zhu (2014) Perceived disorder increases self-regulatory failure
Correlational Geis and Ross (1998) Neighborhood disorder associated with perceived powerlessness
Cutrona et al. (2000), Linares et al. (2001) Neighborhood disorder associated with psychological distress
Ross (2000) Neighborhood disorder associated with depression
Perkins andTaylor (1996) Neighborhood disorder associated with increased fear of crime
and decreased sense of safety
study by Geis and Ross (1998). Analyzing data of a representa-
tive sample of 2,482 adults, aged 18–92 years, in Illinois (from the
1995 survey of Community Crime and Health), they found that
neighborhood-level disorder was associated with perceived pow-
erlessness. WIR can explain this similarly to how it explains the
“meaning in life” ﬁndings by Heintzelman et al. (2013). That is,
by making the world feel random, people start to lose a sense of
control which manifests itself in negative outlooks on life such as
feeling powerless and meaningless. Another likely manifestation is
distress; Cutrona et al. (2000) found that neighborhood-level dis-
order was associated with distress, and this was moderated by life
outlook, temperament, and quality of relationships. Speciﬁcally,
disorder was associated with higher distress among people with
a more negative life outlook, more negative temperament, and
low-quality relationships. Importantly, this study suggests that
although perceiving disorder may result in negative affect via a
reduction in a sense of personal control, it is not inevitable. This is
consistent with recent psychological research showing that people
sometimes buffer against the threat of losing control through com-
pensatory control mechanisms (Whitson and Galinsky, 2008; Kay
et al., 2010). It seems to be currently assumed that people generally
possess and use this ability, but future research may ﬁnd that there
are individual differences. This would clearly have implications for
the proposed model, and may necessitate including moderators.
Ross (2000) analyzed other data from the 1995 survey of Com-
munity Crime and Health and found that neighborhood disorder
was associated with self-reported depression. Again, these results
are consistent with the idea that perceived disorder results in a
sense of losing control, which has insidious psychological conse-
quences. Lastly, Perkins and Taylor (1996) surveyed 412 people
across 50 neighborhoods in Baltimore to evaluate the relationship
between neighborhood disorder and fear of crime. Three meth-
ods were used to measure both physical and social dimensions of
neighborhooddisorder: self-reported resident perceptions, on-site
observations by trained raters, and newspaper content analysis.
All three measures of neighborhood disorder predicted fear of
crime, corroborating the general deﬁnition of perceived disorder
assumed in WIR. As fear is an affective response to threat (Wat-
son, 2000), these ﬁndings can be explained by the sense of threat
resulting from losing a sense of control: When we are threatened,
we generate a primitive ﬁght-or-ﬂight response in which we pay
particular attention to sources of threat in our environment (so
we can avoid them or prepare for them), such as lurking criminals.
It follows that people would start to lose a sense of security and
safety, as documented in this study.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the following discussion, I consider possible alternatives toWIR
and explain why they may be inadequate. I then discuss some
future directions for psychological research on perceived disorder.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
COGNITIVE DISFLUENCY EXPLANATION
Perceived disordermight be cognitively processedmore disﬂuently
than perceived order. Disﬂuency is thought to make people think
more deeply and abstractly (Alter, 2013). Therefore, perceived
disorder might have effects on judgment and behavior through
disﬂuency, though it is unlikely that disﬂuency would have as
severely negative affective consequences as the sense of losing con-
trol proposed by WIR. That said, both accounts could explain
how perceived disorder may result in more accurate judgments
in low-control/high-chance situations – the difference being the
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mechanism through which this happens. WIR would make this
prediction by stating that disorder in the environment results in
priming concepts related to randomness/chance/luck, and thus,
through the availability heuristic, these concepts are appropriately
weighted more in judgment. The cognitive ﬂuency explanation
wouldmake this predictionby stating that peoplemakemore accu-
rate judgments in a disorderly environment because they think
harder (utilizing more effortful “system 2”processing, Kahneman,
2011). Both mechanisms could jointly work together, however,
the recent experimental research reviewed in this article is more
consistent with the conditioning/priming account of WIR than a
disﬂuency account, since it seems unlikely that cognitive disﬂu-
ency would result in the sense of losing control. If anything, it
would result in the opposite.
SOCIAL/RATIONAL AGENT EXPLANATION
This general and prevalent view concerns how perceived disorder
may signal information about social norms and social monitor-
ing. It suggests that people’s judgments and behaviors in disorderly
environments can be understood as rationally aimed at minimiz-
ing expected costs and maximizing expected beneﬁts, given the
available social information. Regarding social norms and signal-
ing, environmental disorder (e.g., litter) deﬁnes the descriptive
norm (“littering is okay here”) which inhibits the effectiveness of
the injunctive norm (e.g., no littering policy), thus the perceived
costs of littering are lowered and people litter (Cialdini et al., 1990;
Cialdini, 2007). Regarding social monitoring, perceived disorder
may reduce the perceived costs of crime (e.g., littering) by signaling
that monitoring/policing is low and thus punishment is unlikely,
thus reducing expected costs of committing crimes. While these
explanations can account widely for BWE (thus their popularity),
they do not provide a clear account for the recent advances in psy-
chological research on perceived disorder, which has documented
that perceived disorder results in threats to and reductions of the
sense of control. That being said, I do not doubt that perceived dis-
order can have such social effects, which is partly why I think that
there may be a“unique psychology”(i.e., a distinct constellation of
psychological phenomena) caused by perceiving disorder—more
on that later.
GOAL-BASED EXPLANATION
This explanation makes similar predictions to the social/rational
agent explanation. Basically, a reduction in the expected costs of a
crime (e.g., littering) due to perceived disorder of that form in the
environment results in a weakened ‘act-appropriately’ goal and
consequently increases the strength of “hedonic” (e.g., littering)
and “gain” (e.g., stealing) goals (see Lindenberg and Steg, 2007;
Keizer et al., 2008). Thus, people who see litter in the environ-
ment also commit other crimes such as illegally using grafﬁti and
stealing. Again, while this can explain BWE and the “spreading of
disorder” (see Keizer et al., 2008), it does not seem to relate with
the documented reduction in a sense of personal control.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A UNIQUE PSYCHOLOGY?
As mentioned above, one direction for future research is to
determine whether there is a distinct cluster of psychological
consequences caused by perceiving disorder. Is there more to it
than just priming randomness-related concepts and the associ-
ated consequences proposed by WIR? To my knowledge, there is
no experimental evidence yet to conﬁrm this. Although Keizer
et al. (2008) proposed that goals are activated and deactivated
in response to perceiving disorder, they did not measure this,
and rather it is implied from the behavioral evidence which may
be completely accounted for by reduced self-control. However,
given the related research on social norms and signaling, I do not
doubt that there is indeed more to the story. Further research can
determine this conclusively.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES?
Cutrona et al. (2000) provides correlational evidence that effects
of perceiving disorder may be moderated by individual differ-
ences such as negativity and poor relationships. Moving forward,
we should experimentally test whether personality measures of
negative temperament (e.g., adult temperament questionnaire,
Rothbart et al., 2000) and relationship quality (e.g., the positive
relations with others scale, Ryff, 1989) have moderating effects
and why. One possibility is that some people may not use compen-
satory controlmechanisms (effectively). Further,Vohs et al. (2013)
assumes that individual differences in reactions to perceiving dis-
order may translate into reactions to situational-level disorder. In
light of this proposition, itmaymake sense to testwhether there are
interactions between classic personality measures regarding reac-
tions to perceived disorder – such as preference for consistency
(Cialdini et al., 1995), need for structure (Neuberg and Newsom,
1993), need for closure (Webster andKruglanski, 1994), and ambi-
guity tolerance (Norton, 1975) – and perceiving disorder in one’s
surroundings.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
To advance an interdisciplinary connection between the psychol-
ogy of perceived disorder and the sociology of BWT, it will be
important to develop laboratory measures analogous to those
interpreted in the sociology of BWT. What would a laboratory
analog be for “throwing a rock through the window of an aban-
doned building?” One may look to the aggression literature for
inspiration. For example, research in this domain has employed
creative behavioralmeasures such as serving hot sauce to a confed-
erate (Bushman et al., 2005), blasting a confederate with aversive
noise (Bushman et al., 2005), and delivering ostensibly painful
shocks (Zillmann,1971) to assess aggressive tendencies,whichmay
have some parallels with criminal behaviors such as vandalism and
theft.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Research on the psychology of perceived disorder is a new and
exciting development. In this article, I propose a parsimonious
cognitive model possibly explaining a variety of effects and rela-
tionships concerning perceived disorder documented across the
psychological and sociological literatures. To recap,WIR proposes
that perceiving disorder results in a threatening sense of losing per-
sonal control (via priming randomness-related concepts), which
can account for a variety of affective, judgmental, and behavioral
ﬁndings in the literatures. Going forward, it is important to further
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corroborate each link in thismodel and delineate boundary condi-
tions. It is also important to determine what aspects of this model
have to do with BWT and what aspects do not. A broader and
more challenging future direction is determining whether there
are parallel psychological processes triggered by perceived disor-
der that collectively deﬁne a unique constellation of psychological
phenomena.
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